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Chief Justice Hughes’ Letter 
on Court-Packing 
Richard D. Friedman 
After one of the great landslides in American 
presidential history, Franklin D. Roosevelt took the 
oath of office for the second time on January 20, 
1937. As he had four years before, Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, like Roosevelt a former 
governor of New York, administered the oath. 
Torrents of rain drenched the inauguration, and 
Hughes’ damp whiskers waved in the biting wind.’ 
When the skullcapped Chief Justice reached the 
promise to defend the Constitution, he “spoke slowly 
and with special emphasis.”2 The President 
responded in kind, though he felt like saying, as he 
later told his aide Sam Ro~enman:~ 
Yes, but it’s the Constitution as I understand 
it, flexible enough to meet any new problem 
of democracy-not the kind of Constitution 
your Court has raised up as barrier to progress 
and democracy. 
Roosevelt’s emphasis in pronouncing the oath was 
not lost on the crowd; some thought he repeated it 
“as if it had been an accusation.” Nor, Rosenman 
was sure, was there any doubt that Hughes, sitting 
just behind the rostrum, understood the President’s 
emphasis when he declared in his address that the 
people “will insist that every agency of popular 
government use effective instruments to carry out 
their will.”4 Though the Supreme Court had upheld 
some of the responses to the Depression attempted 
by the New Deal and the states, several of its 
decisions, particularly those invalidating New Deal 
programs, had frustrated the President immensely. 
The atmosphere was warmer, as well as dryer, as 
the Roosevelts hosted members of the Court for 
dinner and a musical program on February 2.  Hughes 
was in a jovial mood, and when he and Justice Willis 
Van Devanter sat down next to the President after 
the ladies retired, they seemed very convivial. 
Roosevelt appeared to be having so fine a time that 
Senator William Borah of Idaho was reminded of 
the “Roman Emperor who looked around his dinner 
table and began to laugh when he thought of how 
many of those heads would be rolling on the 
morrow.”s Borah could not know how close to the 
truth he was. Attorney General Homer Cummings, 
indeed, whispered uncomfortably to Rosenman that 
he felt too much “like a conspirator.” Rosenman 
agreed, for they were keepers of the best guarded 
secret in Washington6 
Roosevelt himself lacked the gall to reveal the 
secret before the judiciary dinner, but he wanted it 
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Charles Evans Hughes swore in Franklin D. Roosevelt when the President (addressing the public) took the oath of office for the 
second time on January 20, 1937. As the skullcapped Chief Justice (seated at center) reached the promise to defend the 
Constitution, he “spoke slowly and with special emphasis,” and the President responded in kind. 
known before the following week, when arguments 
were scheduled for the cases testing the validity of 
the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore, he 
made his announcement on Friday, February 5,1937, 
first to a meeting of Cabinet and congressional 
leaders and then in a press conference to the world 
at large.7 Tom Corcoran, predicting that Justice Louis 
D. Brandeis “sure won’t like it,” got Roosevelt’s 
permission to break the news earlier that morning to 
“old Isaiah.” The Justice’s reaction when “Tommy 
the Cork” caught up to him in the robing room was 
as forecast8 His Brethren received the news on the 
Bench about an hour later. The lawyer appearing 
before them paused for a moment, disconcerted, 
when he realized his argument was no longer 
receiving the Court’s full a t tent i~n.~ 
The message read by the Justices was a copy of 
the one Roosevelt had just sent Congress. Claiming 
the need for a more efficient judiciary, Roosevelt 
proposed a sweeping plan to reform the entire federal 
judicial system-including the Supreme Court. 
Purportedly aimed at ridding the Court of 
superannuated members, the bill would allow the 
President to appoint an extra Justice, up to a 
maximum of six, for each one who remained on the 
Court six months past his seventieth birthday. 
“Several weeks,” recorded Merlo Pusey soon 
afterwards, “were required to strip. . . the bill of its 
camouflage.” This seems not to have been entirely 
the case. “Too clever, too damned clever,” remarked 
a pro-Administration newspaper immediately after 
the message, and The Nav  York Times reported that 
“Congress instantly recognized its outstanding 
feature and purpose.”’0 
The purpose of that feature, of course, was very 
simply to pack the Court, to add enough new 
members to force it into submission. The supposed 
reform purpose appealed to Roosevelt’s sense of 
misdirection. The ironic fact that it was the 
application to the Supreme Court of a plan proposed 
two decades earlier for the lower courts by the then- 
Attorney General, James C. McReynolds, appealed 
to his puckish sense of humor. That its impact was 
on the stature of the Court, rather than on the 
substance of the Constitution, very likely appealed 
to the jealousy and distrust he had long borne against 
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the legal profession. When Cummings presented him 
with the result of the Justice Department’s research, 
Roosevelt regarded it as “the answer to a maiden’s 
prayer.”“ 
In this case the maiden went into battle heavily 
armed, with the largest majorities in Congress ever 
enjoyed by any President. “Yes, 1 will fight it,” said 
Carter Glass ofVirginia. “But what’s the use? I think 
Congress will do anything in the world the President 
tells them to do.”I2 At the start, indeed, this strength 
alone seemed sufficient to carry Roosevelt through; 
the balance of initial congressional response was 
decidedly in favor of the plan, and the leadership 
expressed confidence that it would pass.I3 For weeks 
after the President’s message, many even thought his 
scheme would be enacted before the end of March.I4 
But the reaction in the country at large, numerous 
surveys showed, was generally hostile. A poll of 
newspapers that had supported Roosevelt against Alf 
Landon in 1936 indicated that most opposed the 
Court plan. Similarly, a Gallup poll showed that one- 
third of those who had voted for Roosevelt opposed 
the plan, while only one Landon voter in ten 
supported it. The legal profession in particular 
reacted strongly, a majority of American Bar 
Association members polled opposing the plan in 
every state and by a six to one vote overall. Soon 
congressional opponents drew on this reservoir of 
hostility, and before February was over Democratic 
defections led them to believe that they had “some 
chance” of stopping the bill. Roosevelt seemed to 
have the numbers to win a vote, but his opponents 
seemed to have enough, at least in the Senate, to put 
off that vote for many weeks.I5 
Roosevelt’s subterfuge about the age of the 
Justices was a major factor in arousing public 
suspicion.I6 He himself later admitted his error in 
presentation of the plan and quickly took a more 
direct appr0a~h.l~ On March 4, sensing that his 
campaign was bogging down, he took advantage of 
a Democratic victory dinner at the Mayflower Hotel 
to shift the battle to firmer ground. Unabashedly he 
laid his first emphasis on party loyalty. Then, reciting 
a litany of national problems, he urged that each one 
must be confronted “NOW,” and that only with a 
favorable Court could the New Deal do so 
successfully. “It will take courage,” he concluded, 
adapting a line from Brandeis’ dissent in New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, “to let our minds be bold.” The 
“NOW” speech was one of Roosevelt’s most 
famous-Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
thought it “by all odds, the greatest he has ever made.” 
Administration operatives, however, were 
disappointed in their search for a change in the nature 
of the battle; reaction to the speech in Congress was 
divided along the lines already laid. And indeed, it 
could hardly be otherwise. The spurious concern 
about age and the state of the Court’s docket had 
drawn some attention, but from the start the focus of 
the debate was on the basic question of whether it 
was wise to pack the Court for ideological reasons.’s 
The Administration might still cling to its first 
ground, but no message from Olympus was necessary 
to clarify the true nature of the debate. 
Confirmation, if any were needed, was given 
strikingly to Roosevelt himself on March 9, when he 
told the nation in a fireside chat, “We have . . . reached 
the point as a nation where we must take action to 
save the Constitution from the Court and the Court 
from itself.” As a clincher, he quoted a passage that 
was found “most arresting” by both newspaper 
columnists and the public at large.I9 “We are under 
a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges 
say it is,” was the line, uttered first in a 1907 speech 
by the then- governor of New York, Charles Evans 
Hughes. 
Three decades later, however, that former 
governor had not yet entered the fray. His inactivity 
was not due to indifference; the bill, he said privately 
a few weeks later, “would destroy the Court as an 
institution.” Nor was it due to a lack of opportunities. 
NBC and Edward R. Murrow of CBS both offered 
Hughes facilities for responding to Roosevelt, but 
he rejected them. Herbert Hoover-an outspoken 
opponent of the plan, unlike the majority of 
Republicans, who thought they would be most 
effective if “meek as skimmed milk’-sent an 
emissary to Hughes asking him to suggest that 
Brandeis retire and speak out against the plan. The 
Chief Justice proved unwilling to discuss the proposal 
with his colleague. What Hoover suggested, he said, 
was “comparable to talking with a man regarding 
the woman he proposed to marry.” And when, before 
the crisis was resolved, Brandeis actually offered to 
retire, Hughes, though fully aware of the potential 
blow to Roosevelt’s scheme, urged him to stay. Very 
simply, Hughes did not regard his role as that of a 
general leading one of the opposing armies in a great 
political battle; rather, he was Chief Justice and thus, 
in his own words, “as disinterested in this matter- 
from a political standpoint-as anyone in the United 
States.” He would only concern himself with his 
official function, and as to that he merely said, “If 
they want me to preside over a convention, I can do 
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it.)720 
Soon Hughes had an opportunity to play a part 
in the battle consistent with his sense of judicial 
propriety. The day after Roosevelt’s fireside chat, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on 
the bill. The Administration was anxious that the 
hearings be finished quickly, but with Henry Fountain 
Ashurst of Arizona presiding that hope was doomed. 
Not only did Ashurst love the limelight,2’ but he was 
the Senate’s chief apostle of inconsistency as “one 
of life’s great virtues.” Praised by a constituent for 
his stand on the President’s bill, he replied, “Which 
stand?” The question was not purely rhetorical. 
Having condemned Court-packing the previous year, 
he turned face after February 5 and introduced the 
President’s bill. His enthusiasm was suspect, 
however, for he resisted all pressure for speed, 
leisurely conducting the committee through seven 
weeks of hearings before beginning an extended 
executive session.22 
The Administration took less than two weeks to 
present its case, and then it was the turn of the 
opposition forces. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, the 
liberal Democrat from Montana, was scheduled to 
lead off their testimony on Monday, March 22. For 
some time he and his allies had been trying to bring 
the Court in on their side of the fight. On March 18 
Wheeler, accompanied by Senators Warren Austin, 
a Republican on the Judiciary Committee, and 
William King, one of the panel’s senior Democrats, 
called on Hughes to ask him to testify against the 
bill. The Chief Justice received the delegation “with 
his usual Jovian a f f a b i l i t ~ ” ~ ~  and expressed 
willingness to appear. He would not do so, however, 
unless accompanied by Brandeis, the senior and most 
revered member of the Court’s liberal wing. The 
Senators left in jubilation, assuming that Hughes 
would testify with Brandeis and Van Devanter, as he 
had two years before against a bill aimed at changing 
the Court’s appellate procedure, This time, however, 
Hughes found that Brandeis stood fast against an 
appearance in which the Justices would ‘‘testify on a 
matter affecting their own integrity.”24 Hughes 
thereupon suggested that he might, in response to a 
request from the committee, write a letter stating the 
facts of the court’s work. That idea Brandeis accepted 
and so, Hughes found, did Van De~an te r .~~  
On Friday morning, therefore, Hughes called 
Senator King at his home to tell him that there was a 
strong feeling that the Court should not enter the 
controversy “in any direct or even indirect way.” But, 
he continued, with a characteristic emphasis, if the 
committee should desire information on the work of 
the Court, “of course we will be glad to give the 
facts.” He would give them “in writing an answer to 
specific inquiries, if the committee desires facts.” 
“The material is all there,” he added, indicating that 
it was a matter of public record anyway.26 
After his conversation with King, Hughes reached 
Wheeler at his office and gave him the same message. 
Either the Senator did not understand or he lost his 
nerve-perhaps because he had vociferously opposed 
Hughes’ confirmationz7-and he did not act on the 
Chief Justice’s offer. But the next day, responding to 
what he hopefully regarded as a tip-off from his friend 
Brandeis, he called on the aged Justice. Brandeis 
prodded the reluctant Wheeler to ring Hughes, 
leading the Senator by the hand to the phone and 
holding him there while he made the call himself. 
Told that Wheeler would like to see him, Hughes 
responded cordially and suggested that the Senator 
come over immediately.28 
And so, late that afternoon Wheeler called on the 
Chief Justice at his large house on R Street. Once 
more Hughes gave him a warm reception. When 
was the letter needed, he asked. Monday morning, 
replied Wheeler. Why so soon? “They’ve circulated 
a story that I will not testify after all,” Wheeler 
explained. “If I put it off Monday, they’ll say I never 
will take the stand.”29 Wheeler might, of course, have 
begun his testimony without the letter, as he had 
planned. It would have the most impact, though, if 
presented at the beginning of the opposition 
testimony; besides, he “wanted the drama of the 
moment of presenting the letter to be his.”30 
Hughes comprehended. Gone was his insistence 
that the request for information be from the 
committee itself and that it be in the form of specific 
written questions. Looking at his watch, he said, “It 
is now five-thirty. The library is closed, my secretary 
is gone. . . . Can you come by early Monday 
morning?’ Certainly, answered Wheeler, but then 
Hughes asked whether he was free Sunday afternoon. 
Wheeler was, and so the next day Hughes called him 
up and asked him to drop over.31 
“The baby is born,” the Chief Justice said with 
apparent solemnity, handing Wheeler a long 
typewritten letter as his visitor walked in. “Does that 
answer your question?” Hughes asked after the 
Senator read through it. “Yes, it does,” responded 
Wheeler happily. “It certainly does.”32 
And it certainly did. The letter, thought two 
veteran journalists, was “a masterpiece of 
exp~sit ion.”~~ Roosevelt’s original line of attack, the 
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alleged inefficiency of the Court, had struck a chord 
on which Hughes, the exemplar of efficiency, was 
particularly sensitive. He responded with his favorite 
weapon, the facts.34 When the Court rose for the 
current recess, he pointed out, it had heard cases for 
which certiorari was granted only four weeks before; 
for several Terms the Court had been able to adjourn 
after disposing of all cases ready to be heard. Of 
course, the Court itself through exercise of the 
certiorari power determined just how heavy its docket 
would be, but Hughes thought his Brethren believed 
“that if any error is being made in dealing with these 
applications it is on the side of liberality.” This view 
was not universally held, but even Attorney General 
Cummings had admitted before February that many 
cases reaching the Supreme Court did not possess 
sufficient merit to warrant substantive consideration. 
Moreover, Stone, the Justice who most vigorously 
criticized Hughes’ emphasis on efficiency in the 
conduct of the Court, wrote at about the time of 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a liberal 
Democrat from Montana (above, left), 
led the opposition to the Court-packing 
bill. He was accompanied by Senator 
Warren Austin (left), a Vermont 
Republican, and William King (above), a 
senior Democrat from Utah, both 
members of the Judiciary Committee, on 
his visit to persuade Chief Justice 
Hughes to testify against FDR’s 
proposal. Hughes initially accepted, but 
after consulting Justice Brandeis, he 
decided that it was improper for the 
Court to publicly testify on a subject 
concerning its integrity. A second visit by 
Wheeler, this time to Hughes’ home, 
persuaded the Chief Justice to write a 
letter to the committee expressing his 
views on the lack of necessity for 
additional Justices. 
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Hughes’ letter that the Court had “made the mistake 
of being over-generous’’ in granting the 
 application^.^^ 
Not only was the addition of new Justices 
unnecessary for efficiency, wrote Hughes, it would 
positively hamper the Court’s operation. Despite his 
confidence that he could “preside over a convention,” 
he had made clear, in lectures on the Court that he 
delivered before becoming Chief Justice, his belief 
that the Court should not be expanded: 
Everyone who has worked in a group knows 
the necessity of limiting size to obtain 
efficiency. And this is peculiarly true of a 
judicial body. It is too much to say that the 
Supreme Court could not do its work if two 
more members were added, but I think that 
the consensus of competent opinion is that it 
is now large enough.36 
Now, in the letter to Wheeler, Hughes merely 
confirmed this earlier view: “There would be more 
judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges 
to discuss, more judges to be convinced and to 
decide.” 
The suggestion had been made that this problem 
could be solved by dividing the Court into panels for 
most cases, but Hughes responded to such a 
suggestion in the Supreme Court lectures, when he 
had said, “Happily, suggestions for an increased 
number and for two divisions of the Court have not 
been favored because of their impracticality in view 
of the character of the Court’s most important 
fun~tion.”’~ 
But the letter to Wheeler went a step beyond. 
“The Constitution,” he added, “does not appear to 
authorize” a division of the Supreme Court into 
panels. The passage is mystifying, because it was 
arguably, as The New Republic claimed blatantly 
improper as “an advisory opinion run riot.”38 
From the beginning of the Republic the 
Supreme Court had held it improper to advise on 
constitutional questions outside the context of a 
properly presented case. If Hughes’ comment 
seemed tame because it clearly could not be 
authoritative, it also appeared to be a more flagrant 
impropriety because it was written by one Justice 
outside the ordinary procedures of the Court. 
Commenting in his Supreme Court lectures on an 
advisory opinion given by the Justices in response 
to a question propounded by President James 
Monroe, Hughes had said 
This, of course, was extra-official, but it is 
safe to say that nothing of the sort could 
happen today. . . . [I]t is only with the light 
afforded by a real contest that opinions on 
questions of the highest importance can safely 
be rendered.39 
Not only did Hughes, it seems, offer an advisory 
opinion in his letter to Wheeler, but Brandeis and 
Van Devanter, both of whom were extremely 
meticulous about judicial procedure,4O both approved 
the message after going over it caref~lly.~’ One 
Justice, perhaps, might not notice that in the haste of 
composition a single sentence inadvertently seemed 
to offer a constitutional opinion, but not all three. 
One Justice, perhaps, might not mind breaching the 
bounds ofjudicial propriety to protect the Court, but 
probably not all three. 
Compounding the mystery is the con-sideration 
that the apparent advisory opinion was not in fact 
necessary for the letter. The practical problem raised 
by Hughes-that “a decision by a part of the court 
would be unsatisfactory’’-was enough to dispose 
of the divided-Court proposal. If more weight were 
needed, it could have been given by a passing-and 
perfectly appropriate-reference to the serious con- 
stitutional question posed by the suggestion. The 
impact of the letter, one can be virtually certain, 
would not have been diminished. 
Perhaps, however, this all takes the matter too 
seriously. It may well be that Hughes was, in fact, 
trying only to express the point that the 
constitutionality of separate panels was in serious 
doubt. By saying that the Constitution “does not 
appear to authorize” the suggestion, he may simply 
have been pointing to the fact that no textual authority 
appears in the document; an unresolved question was 
therefore presented. Instead of elaborating on the 
point or making it stand alone, either of which he 
might have done had the constitutional point been 
clear, he also pointed out the practical objections. 
Perhaps, then, the explanation of the mysterious 
passage is simply that Hughes’ words seemed more 
definite than his intention. 
This mystery makes more intriguing another one 
associated with the letter. “On account of the 
shortness of time,” Hughes said before closing, 
I have not been able to consult with the 
members of the Court generally with respect 
to the foregoing statement, but I am confident 
that it is in accord with the views of the 
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justices. I should say, however, that I have 
been able to consult with Mr. Justice Van 
Devanter and Mr. Justice Brandeis, and I am 
at liberty to say that the statement is approved 
by them. 
The apology is intriguing, for the shortness of 
time arose from no necessity but from the political 
considerations stated by Wheeler. Hughes was Chief 
Justice and, if propriety demanded that the other 
Justices be consulted, it was for him and not the 
Senator to determine the timing of the message. 
Moreover, his plea that time was lacking is belied by 
the fact that he prepared the letter for Sunday 
afternoon rather than for the Monday morning 
deadline set by Wheeler. And, finally, it is clear that 
Hughes simply overstated the difficulty of contacting 
his colleagues. All could have been reached by 
telephone; as Stone later pointed out, all were in town 
and several lived within a few minutes’ walk of 
Hughes’ house. “[Tlhe Chief Justice,” said Stone a 
few weeks later, “knows well that he can find out 
what I think any time by asking- sometimes he finds 
out without asking.”42 
Perhaps it was Hughes’ confidence that he did in 
fact know what the other Justices were thinking that 
led him to write the letter without consulting them. 
At least he was correct on the major issues, for all 
the Justices were hostile to the packing plan. 
Nevertheless, Hughes expressed more confidence 
than he was entitled to, for the Brethren certainly 
were not unanimous in approving his statement on 
the constitutionality of separate panels. When 
Hughes brought up the letter at the next conference 
of the Court, several Justices expressed approval and 
no dissent was heard.43 But Justice Stone, for one, 
held his tongue only because with the message 
already public he saw no reason to make a fight. And 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, at least, felt the same way.- 
That this portion of the letter was of so little 
significance to the whole, however, precludes the 
supposition that Hughes disingenuously withheld the 
text from his colleagues so that he could sneak the 
controversial passage through. 
More likely, it seems, Hughes declined to 
circulate the letter because he was afraid that, for the 
speed needed in this case, even nine Justices were 
too many. Hughes was always eager-and certainly 
more eager than Stone and Cardozo-to conclude a 
case and move Very likely, he wanted simply 
to avoid the days of delay that might ensue if all the 
associates offered their specific suggestions. 
Certainly he was right in believing that, since the 
letter was not the exercise of an official function, 
there was no technical requirement for the entire 
Court to approve it. Certainly, too, he had a point 
when he said, as he indicated to Wheeler the 
concurrence of Brandeis and Van Devanter, that “they 
are the though the agreement of Van 
Devanter might have been expected, that of the 
liberals’ leader shook the President’s forces badly.47 
Nevertheless, it was the “widespread impression of 
unanimity . . . that did so much to give the Hughes 
letter its force,”48 and Hughes could not be 
confident- and indeed on the split-panel point was 
mistaken-in giving that impression. Merlo Pusey 
was incorrect in saying that Hughes committed “a 
tactical error” by releasing the letter without 
consulting all his  colleague^.^^ The tactical criteria 
were speed and the impression of unanimity, and 
Hughes achieved both. 
Whether Hughes acted properly in failing to 
consult his colleagues is another matter. In my view, 
he did not, because his rush was determined by 
political factors.50 In his eagerness to contribute to 
the defeat of the Court-packing plan consistently with 
his standards of judicial propriety, Hughes clouded 
those standards somewhat. 
The transgression was relatively trivial, however. 
Even in the letter, the only public comment he made 
during the Court-packing battle that related more than 
tangentially to Roosevelt’s plan,51 Hughes refrained 
from taking an active political role. “It was good 
tactics,” thought Harold Ickes, for Hughes to 
concentrate on the inefficiency argument.52 But it 
was not tactics at all, Hughes indicated in the letter, 
only a fitting regard for “the appropriate attitude of 
the Court in relation to questions of policy.” For 
Hughes it would have been a gross impropriety to 
enter a political debate deciding what should be the 
function of the Court in American government. No 
matter how strong his feelings were on that score, 
his proper role was limited to advice on how the 
Court might best exercise whatever function the 
people gave it. 
Writing the letter must have given Hughes an 
emotional release, for as Wheeler began to leave 
Hughes asked him to sit down instead. According to 
Wheeler’s later recollection, the Chief Justice was in 
a chatty mood. The bill would destroy the Court, he 
said. Moreover, the crisis might have been avoided 
had there been a better Attorney General, one in 
whom the President, the Court, and the people had 
more confidence. In comments more justly 
applicable to ousted Solicitor General J. Crawford 
Biggs than to Homer Cummings, who was in fact 
one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors, Hughes 
complained that not only were the laws badly drafted, 
but the government’s cases were badly presented to 
the Court: “We’ve had to be not only the Court but 
we’ve had to do the work that should have been done 
by the Attorney General.” He could have brought 
down Wall Street lawyers, Hughes continued, who 
would have been able to correct some of the abuses 
in the nation’s business life in a professional manner. 
Rambling on, he told Wheeler about how Roosevelt 
had approached him to ask for a co-operative 
relationship with the Court. Finally seeing his guest 
off, the Chief Justice said, “I hope you’ll see that this 
gets wide publicity.” Stifling a laugh, Wheeler 
assured him, “You don’t need to worry about that.”53 
The rest, after all, was Wheeler’s job. Hughes 
was home working as usual the next day when the 
Senator read the letter to the Judiciary Committee.54 
Given a grandiloquent introduction by Ashurst, who 
suspected from the smug look on Mrs. Wheeler’s face 
that her husband was about to “blow us out of the 
water,”55 Wheeler began very slowly, in a roundabout 
fashion. Finally warming up to the subject, he said 
that, after hearing the Administration testimony, “I 
went to the only source in the country that could know 
exactly what the facts were and that better than 
anyone else.” Wheeler, milking the drama to the last 
drop, paused and glanced around the hearing room, 
and the buzzing stopped for the first time in weeks. 
Senators leaned forward silently, expectantly, as their 
colleague continued: 
And I have here now a letter by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. Charles 
Evans Hughes, dated March 2 1,1937, written 
by him and approved by Mr. Justice Brandeis 
and Mr. Justice Van Devanter. Let us see what 
these gentlemen say about it.56 
“You could have heard a comma drop in the caucus 
room while I read the letter aloud,” wrote Wheeler 
later. The reporters all wanted copies when the 
session recessed, “and it was all I could do to keep it 
from being snatched from my hands.”57 
The next morning, of course, those reporters 
made Hughes’ letter the top news story of the day. 
The message, reported The New York Times, came 
with “an authority and suddenness which took 
administration forces by surprise and sent them 
scurrying to strengthen their defenses.” There could 
be no doubt of the letter’s dramatic force, but 
beginning a few years later a myth grew up that, as 
even so acute an observer as Robert H. Jackson 
thought, it “turned the tide in the struggle.” Hughes, 
not given to making boastful claims, himself thought 
that the letter “had a devastating effect,” and others 
have taken a similar view.58 In reality, however, the 
letter had little real impact on the Court-packing 
fight. 
From simple reason, one would expect this to be 
so. True, Hughes’ letter did “show up for good and 
all as utterly hollow the smooth propositions with 
which the President had offered his bill,” for it 
demonstrated with force, clarity, and detail that the 
Court was keeping abreast of its work. But, as 
Hughes had told King, none of the facts were hard to 
find. Court aides had given reporters the basic 
information on the very day of the President’s 
message. Even more significantly, Solicitor General 
Stanley F. Reed, in his annual report to Congress filed 
in January- before he knew what the President was 
planning -had affirmed that there was no congestion 
in the Supreme Court calendar.59 Moreover, it was 
clear weeks before March 22, even to those who had 
not realized it on February 5, that the true point at 
issue was not the technical one ofjudicial efficiency. 
“We abandoned this ground some time ago,” noted 
Ickes on March 26.6O A letter, even one written by a 
Chief Justice, concentrating on the state of a Court’s 
docket could not be expected to have a crucial effect 
on a monumental debate that had long since focused 
on ideological and constitutional issues. 
This logical supposition is supported by assessing 
the strength of the Court-packing proposal through 
the course of the battle. No clear turning point in 
the struggle is discernible around the time of Hughes’ 
letter. Well before March 22, mounting opposition 
had slowed down the President’s drive; well after, 
that drive was still expected to reach eventual success. 
Nobody, reported Arthur Krock well along in the 
Judiciary Committee hearings, thought the testimony 
had changed any votes.61 After the first flurry of 
excitement, indeed, Hughes’ letter was hardly ever 
mentioned. 
A long series of blows defeated Roosevelt’s 
scheme. On March 29, exactly a week after Wheeler 
read the letter, the Court upheld a state minimum 
wage law by a 5-4 vote, though it had invalidated 
another one the previous year. In April it upheld the 
National Labor Relations Act, again by a 5-4 vote, 
and in May it turned back challenges to the Social 
Security Act, in part by another 5-4 margin. Though 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt and James A. Farley (left), Postmaster General and Chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, shared a joke at the Jefferson Island Club on the Chesapeake Bay, where the President had 
invited all 407 Democratic Congressmen for a weekend of fun. The three-day event was successful in that FDR 
used his charm to rally support for a revised Court hill. 
reality was more complex than appearance,62 these 
cases gave a definite impression of a politically 
motivated change in the Court’s jurisprudence: “A 
switch in time saves nine” became the enduring quip. 
On May 18, Justice Van Devanter announced that he 
would retire when the Term ended, and so further 
undercut the argument that Court-packing was 
necessary to assure a liberal course of decisions. On 
the same day, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 
against the proposal, and it followed the vote up on 
June 14 with a blisteringly hostile report against the 
plan. 
But the President still had deep reservoirs of 
strength, loyalty, and affection to call on, and he 
replenished these by throwing a three-day picnic for 
congressional Democrats on Jefferson Island in the 
Chesapeake Bay. With Roosevelt using all his powers 
of charm and geniality, even upon the Democratic 
authors of the vituperative committee report, the 
event was a great success. Democrats’ inclination to 
uphold their leader remained strong, as indicated by 
the reaction when a compromise bill was introduced 
on July 2. Allowing the appointment of only one co- 
Justice a year, and making the trigger age seventy- 
five instead of seventy, the new bill was conceded to 
have enough support for a comfortable passage in 
the Senate if it ever reached a vote. That was a big 
if, however. By the time floor debate began on the 
new bill on July 6, its opponents had overcome their 
initial discouragement and decided that a filibuster 
rather than a frontal assault was their soundest 
strategy.63 
The tactic had some effect, and after a week of 
debate the bill had clearly lost several votes.64 On 
July 14, however, occurred the critical event: 
exhausted by the battle and by a Washington heat 
wave, Senator Joseph Robinson, the Senate majority 
leader, died of a heart attack. Only later would 
opposition leaders concede that they had been beaten 
“right up to the time of Senator Robinson’s death.” 
Roosevelt had pledged Robinson the first open seat 
on the Court, and loyalty to him among his Senate 
colleagues had enabled him to get pledges for the 
bill from a majority of them.6s Moreover, the prospect 
of an appointment of Robinson, who would not have 
reliably entrenched a liberal majority on the Court, 
strengthened the attractiveness of Court-packing for 
liberals. As Robert Allen wrote some days later, 
Had he lived, the chances are that Robinson 
could have put through the [compromise] bill. 
. . . It would have been a long and vicious 
fight, but the advantage was definitely with 
the Administration.66 
On Robinson’s death, however, the situation changed 
“in a matter of hours.” Several Senators who had 
given him personal pledges switched sides 
immediatel~.~’  Within days Roosevelt had to 
acknowledge that Court-packing was dead. 
It seems to be only in later years, when simple 
explanations were sought for the death of Court- 
packing, that so much emphasis was put on Hughes’ 
letter to Wheeler. It was significant that Republican 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, in an article written 
shortly after the struggle was completed and listing 
the statements most crucial for victory, did not 
mention the letter at The letter may be compared 
to a bolt of lightning that misses, or rather (to 
anthropomorphize it) shies away, from the mark; 
sharp, dramatic, and forceful, it could hardly be 
ignored and would certainly be remembered, but in 
truth it did not have a very profound effect. 
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